Serpent is one of the 5 AES nalists The best attack published so far analyzes up to 9 rounds. In this paper we present attacks on 7-round, 8-round, and 10-round variants of Serpent. We attack 7-round variant with all key lengths, and 8-and 10-round variants with 256-bit keys. The 10-round attack on the 256-bit keys variants is the best published attack on the cipher. The attack enhances the ampli ed boomerang attack and uses better di erentials. We also present the best 3-round, 4-round, 5-round and 6-round di erential characteristics of Serpent.
Introduction
Serpent 1] is a block cipher which was suggested as a candidate for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 8], and was selected to be among the ve nalists.
In 4] a modi ed variant of Serpent in which the linear transformation was modi ed into a permutation was analyzed. The permutation allows one active S box to activate only one S box in the consecutive round, a property that cannot occur in Serpent. Thus, it is not surprising that this variant is much weaker than Serpent, and that it can be attacked with up to 35 rounds.
In 6] the 256-bit variant of Serpent up to 9 rounds is attacked using an ampli ed boomerang attack. The attack is based on building a 7-round distinguisher for Serpent, and using it for attacking up to 9-rounds. The distinguisher is built using the ampli ed boomerang technique. It uses a 4-round di erential characteristic in rounds 1{4, and a 3-round characteristic in rounds 5{7.
In this paper we enhance the the ampli ed boomerang attack, and present the best 3-round, 4-round, 5-round and 6-round di erential characteristics of Serpent published so far. We use these characteristic to devise an attack on 7-round Serpent with all key lengths, and an attack on 8-round Serpent with 256-bit keys. We also use these results to develop the best known distinguisher for 8-round Serpent by presenting a new cryptanalytic tool | the rectangle attack. This tool is then used to attack 10-round 256-bit key Serpent.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give the description of Serpent. In Section 3 we present a di erential attack on 7-round Serpent, and a di erential attack on 8-round 256-bit key Serpent. In Section 4 we present the Rectangle Attack, and in Section 5 we describe the 8-round distinguisher and implement the attack on 10-round 256-bit key Serpent. Section 6 summarizes the paper. In the appendices we describe new 3-round, 4-round, 5-round and 6-round di erential characteristics, which are the best known so far.
A Description of Serpent
Serpent 1] is a block cipher with block size of 128 bits and 0{256 bit keys. It is an SP-network, consisting of alternating layers of key mixing, S boxes and linear transformation. Serpent has an equivalent bitsliced description, which makes it very e cient.
The key scheduling algorithm of serpent accepts 256-bit keys. Shorter keys are padded by 1 followed by as many 0's needed to have a total length of 256 bits. The key is then used to derive 33 subkeys of 128 bits.
We use the notations of 1]. Each intermediate value of the round i is denoted byB i (which is a 128-bit value). The rounds are numbered from 0 to 31. Eacĥ B i is composed of four 32-bit words X 0 ; X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 .
Serpent has 32 rounds, and a set of eight 4-bit to 4-bit S boxes. Each round function R i (i 2 f0; : : :; 31g) uses a single S box 32 times in parallel. For example, R 0 uses S 0 , 32 copies of which are applied in parallel. Thus, the rst copy of S 0 takes bits 0 from X 0 ; X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 and returns the output to the same bits (0). This is implemented as a boolean expression of the 4 registers.
The set of eight S-boxes is used four times. S 0 is used in round 0, S 1 is used in round 1, etc. After using S 7 in round 7 we use S 0 again in round 8, then S 1 in round 9, and so on. The last round is slightly di erent from the others: apply S 7 onB 31 K 31 , and XOR the result withK 32 rather than applying the linear transformation.
The cipher may be formally described by the following equations:
where R i (X) = LT(Ŝ i (X K i )) i = 0; : : :; 30
whereŜ i is the application of the S-box S imod8 thirty two times in parallel, and LT is the linear transformation. The linear transformation is as follows: The 32 bits in each of the output words are linearly mixed by X 0 ; X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 :=Ŝ i (B i K i ) X 0 := X 0 <<< 13 X 2 := X 2 <<< 3 X 1 := X 1 X 0 X 2 X 3 := X 3 X 2 (X 0 << 3) X 1 := X 1 <<< 1 X 3 := X 3 <<< 7 X 0 := X 0 X 1 X 3 X 2 := X 2 X 3 (X 1 << 7) X 0 := X 0 <<< 5 X 2 := X 2 <<< 22 B i+1 := X 0 ; X 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 where <<< denotes rotation, and << denotes shift. In the last round, this linear transformation is replaced by an additional key mixing: B 32 := S 7 (B 31 K 31 ) K 32 .
3 Di erential Attack on 7-and 8-Round Serpent In this section we present an attacks on 7-round and 8-round Serpent from round 4 to round 10 (or round 11 in the 8-round variant), i.e., encryption starts with S 4 and ends with S 2 (S 3 for the 8-round variant) 1 . In Appendix D a 6-round di erential characteristic between round 4 and round 9 with probability 2 ?93 is presented. In the rest of this paper we keep the round numbers as in the corresponding rounds of Serpent, i.e., from round 4 to round 10, rather than from round 0 to round 6.
We adopt the representation of the di erential characteristics using gures as in 5], but add more data to the gures. The gures describe data blocks by The rows are the bitsliced 32-bit words, and each column is the input to a di erent S box. The upper line represents X 0 , the lower line represents X 3 , and the rightmost column represents the least signi cant bits of the words. A thin arrow represents a probability of 1/8 for the speci c S box (given the input di erence, the output di erence is achieved with probability 1/8), and a fat arrow stands for probability 1/4. If there is a di erence in a bit, the box related to it is lled. Example for our notation can be found in Figure 1 , in which in the rst S box (S box 0; related to bits 0) the input di erence 1 causes an output di erence 3 with probability 1/4, and in S box 30 input di erence 3 causes an output di erence 1 with probability 1/8.
The attack uses 2 14 characteristics with di erent input di erences but the same output di erence. The 2 14 characteristics di er only in the rst round, in which they have the same active S boxes with di erent input di erences. All the characteristics have the same di erences after the rst round, and all have the same probability 2 ?93 . The input di erence for one of the 6-round characteristics is presented in Figure 2 , and the common output is presented in Figure 3 (the full characteristic is presented in Appendix D). The attack requires 2 32 structures of 2 52 chosen plaintexts each. In each structure all the inputs to the 19 inactive S boxes in the rst round are xed to some (random) value, while the 52 bits of input to the 13 active S boxes receive all the 2 52 possible values. In this data there are 2 32 2 51 = 2 83 pairs for each possible characteristic. Each characteristic has probability 2 ?93 , therefore, we expect that about 2 83 2 14 2 ?93 = 2 4 pairs satisfy one of the characteristics. We call these pairs right pairs. The number of possible pairs in each structure is (2 52 ) 2 =2 = 2 103 , thus we have 2 103 2 32 = 2 135 pairs to consider in total.
Each pair satisfying one of the characteristics has 19 active S boxes in round 10, thus any pair with non-zero output di erence in one of the remaining 13 S boxes can be automatically discarded. Thus, about 2 103?52 = 2 51 candidates for right pairs remain from each structure.
Moreover, in 3 S boxes only 4 output di erences are possible if one of the characteristics is satis ed, in 6 S boxes only 6 output di erences are possible, in 9 S boxes only 7 output di erences are possible, and in the remaining S box eight output di erences are possible. Discarding any pair with a wrong output di erence using the above lter should keep only a fraction of 4 For each remaining pair we compute a list of possible whitening subkeys of the 19 active S boxes in the last round. For each active S box, each pair suggests at most 4 values for the subkey of that S box. Thus, counting on m S boxes results in at most 2 18:78 4 m = 2 18:78+2m hits. The average number of hits (for a wrong value) is 2 18:78+2m =2 4m , which is smaller than 1 for m 10. On the other hand, the correct subkey is counted for each right pair, i.e., about 16 times, and thus it can be easily identi ed when m 10. Then, we count on the remaining 9 S boxes and take the only value suggested more than two or three times. Note that even if we got more than one possible subkey after counting on 10 S boxes, only one of them is expected to remain after this stage. In total we retrieve 76 subkey bits using at most 2 38:78 one round encryptions and 2 40 4-bit counters. We can retrieve 52 additional bits by analyzing the rst round as well.
After we retrieve 128 bits of subkey material we can easily nd a 128-bit key using linear equations. For 192-and 256-bit keys we can take another set of characteristics. The new set includes the original characteristics used in the attack rotated one bit to the left, i.e., if we have a di erence in the least signi cant bit of X 0 in the original characteristics, we have a di erence in the second bit (bit 1) of X 0 in the new set. There is an additional set, in which the rotation is by two bits. (Note that rotation by 3 bits does not make good characteristics). This way we obtain additional 36 subkey bits from round 4 (as out of the 52 bits in the input to the 13 active S boxes there are 16 common bits). This phase of the attack is much simpler, as we already know the common 16 subkey bits, and can easily discard wrong pairs. We also get 32 additional bits from round 10, thus obtaining additional 68 bits (36 from round 4, and 32 from round 10). For 192-bit keys, this information su cient to recover the key. For 256-bit keys we can use other di erentials with probability 2 ?94 (which are just equivalent to the di erential we have used with slight modi cations in the last round of the characteristic) using similar techniques and retrieve the remaining unknown bits.
We conclude that the attack requires 2 52 2 32 = 2 84 plaintexts for 128-bit keys, and twice as much for 192-bit and 256-bit keys. The time complexity of the attack is 2 85 memory accesses. The memory requirements are 2 40 4-bit counters and 2 52 cells for an hash table.
In order to reduce the time of analysis we perform the algorithm in the following way: to the 40 bits of the subkey (as there are 4m subkey bits, and for m = 10 we get the best results). 2. Collect all the (few) subkeys whose counter has at least 10 hits. With a high probability the correct subkey is in this list (and it is the only one in it). 3. For each pair suggesting a value in the list, we complete the subkey of the other 9 S box in round 10, and the 13 S boxes from round 4. As we should have only right pairs (with very few additional wrong pairs), and as the right pairs agree on the rest of the subkey, we can identify the right subkey by intersecting the sets proposed by the various pairs.
. For each structure 2 52 memory accesses are performed for the hashing. In the hash table about 1=e of the entries are empty, and 1=e of the entries contain only one plaintext (and no pairs need to be analyzed). Counting on all the possibilities for the number of plaintexts in each entry of the hash table we conclude that 2 51 pairs from each structure need to be analyzed. Most of them are discarded by the rst lter, and about 2 13 pairs remain for the second ltering and counting. Therefore, we can estimate the work for each structure as the work needed to hash all plaintexts and then to look at the hash table after the hashing was done, and to perform the search whenever there are more than two plaintexts in one hash entry. The number of pairs we expect to check is 2 51 and most of them can be discarded almost immediately. We perform about 2 53 memory accesses for each structure, and the amount of work needed for the whole attack is equivalent to about 2 33 2 52 = 2 85 memory accesses.
8-Round 256-Bit Key Serpent
One can easily extend our attack to 8 rounds for the 256-bit key variant by guessing the subkey of round 11. For each possible value of the subkey of round 11 we decrypt the last round and use the attack from the previous subsection. This way, there is no need to make the extra work of completing the key by retrieving other subkeys. The data complexity remains the same 2 84 , and the time complexity is 2 128 2 85 = 2 213 memory accesses with 2 40 counters. 4 The Rectangle Attack
Ampli ed Boomerang Attack
The main idea of the ampli ed boomerang attack 6] is to use two short di erential characteristics instead of one long characteristic. Therefore, this technique is very useful when we have good short di erential characteristics and very bad long ones.
Let a cipher E : f0; 1g n f0; 1g k ! f0; 1g n be composed of two encryption functions E 0 and E 1 . Thus, E = E 1 E 0 . We assume that a good di erential is not known for E, but for E 0 we have a di erential characteristic ! with probability p, and for E 1 we have a di erential characteristic ! with probability q, where pq 2 ?n=2 .
The basic attack is based on building quartets of plaintexts (x; y; z; w) which satisfy several di erential conditions. Assume that x y = and z w = . Each pair has probability p to satisfy the characteristic ! in E 0 . We denote by x 0 ; y 0 ; z 0 ; w 0 the encrypted values of x; y; z; w under E 0 , respectively (x 0 = E 0 (x); : : :; w 0 = E 0 (w)). We are interested in the cases where x 0 y 0 = , z w 0 = and x 0 z 0 = , as in these cases y 0 w 0 = (x 0 ) (z 0 ) = as well. We receive two pairs for E 1 each with input di erence . When encrypting those x 0 ; y 0 ; z 0 ; w 0 by E 1 , in some of the cases the input di erence becomes , and we look for the cases where both di erences become x 00 z 00 = and Figure 4 .
The question which rises is what is the fraction of the right quartets among all the quartets. If we have m pairs with di erence , a fraction of about p of them satis es the characteristic for E 0 . Thus, we have about mp pairs with output di erence in the input to E 1 , giving about (mp) 2 =2 quartets consisting of two such pairs. Assuming that the intermediate encryption values distribute uniformly over all possible values, then with probability 2 ?n we get x 0 and z 0 such that x 0 z 0 = , but once this occurs we automatically get another pair with input di erence (the pairs are (x 0 ; z 0 ) and (y 0 ; w 0 )). Note that x 0 and w 0 have also a probability 2 ?n to have a di erence x 0 z 0 = , thus, given two pairs (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (z 0 ; w 0 ) we have two ways to use them as a quartet, with probability 2 ?n+1 . Therefore, we have (mp) 2 =2 2 ?n+1 quartets which might satisfy our requirements. Each of the pairs satis es the second characteristic for E 1 with probability q. Thus, starting with m pairs (x; y),(z; w), the expected number of right quartets is: mp 2 2 ?n+1 q 2 2 ?n = m 2 2 ?n (pq) 2 :
Therefore, the distinguisher counts quartets (x; y; z; w) of plaintexts which satisfy that x 00 z 00 = y 00 w 00 = .
For a random permutation (or for a random value of and ) the expected number of quartets is m 2 2 ?2n , as there are m 2 possible quartets (there are m 2 =2 pairs of pairs, and each pair of pairs can create two quartets e.g., (x; y); (z; w) and (x; y); (w; z)). For each pair (x; z) or (y; w) the probability of having a speci c di erence in the output is 2 ?n . Therefore, if pq > 2 ?n=2 , we would count more quartets than random noise. This way when m is su ciently large we can have a distinguisher which distinguishes between E and a random cipher.
Rectangling the Boomerang
The rst improvement was suggested in 6], in which it was observed that instead of requiring a speci c , we can count on all possible 0 values for which 0 ! by E 1 .
Therefore, the probability Pr 2 ( ! ) = q 2 for the pairs (x 0 ; z 0 ) and (y 0 ; w 0 ) to have output di erence is replaced by the probability P quartets satisfying the rectangle conditions. As a result, we might prefer the di erence x 00 z 00 to be some value which has many lower probability characteristics instead of an optimal with one characteristic with the highest probability. Our second improvement is quite similar. Instead of discarding pairs with wrong value, we sort the pairs to piles according to the output di erence ( ) of E 0 . For each possible pile we perform the original attack. For each pile we have probability Note that this improvement counts all the quartets with plaintext di erence and ciphertext di erence . However, it is very hard to do the exact calculation.
Attacking 10-Round Serpent
In Section 4 we presented a method to build a distinguisher for a function E = E 1 E 0 . We now present a method to use the distinguisher to nd subkey material.
We attack a 10-round 256-bit key Serpent (round 0 to round 9) using an 8-round rectangle distinguisher. In this distinguishing attack E 0 is rounds 1{4 of Serpent, and E 1 is rounds 5{8. The basic di erential characteristic ( ! ) used in rounds 1{4 is also the best known 4-round di erential characteristic of Serpent. This characteristic and the basic di erential characteristic used in rounds 5{8 are presented in Appendix B. and are presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6 , respectively.
The rst di erential has probability of 2 ?29 . Using the second improvement and counting on all possible output di erences of round 4, we receive P 0 Pr 2 ! 0 ] = 2 ?50:8 . The second di erential has probability of 2 ?47 . Using the rst improvement and counting on a large set of characteristics (all are very similar to the basic one, and have the same last two rounds) we receive P 0 Pr 2 0 ! ] = 2 ?69:8 . These probabilities were computed by a computer program which scanned characteristics similar to those presented in Appendix B.
For m = 2 125:8 pairs with the di erence of Figure 5 about 2 (2 125:8 2 ?25:4 ) 2 =2 = 2 200:8 quartets can be formed after the fourth round. The probability to get a speci c is about 2 ?128 , thus the expected number of quartets with a given is about 2 72:8 quartets. As P 0 Pr 2 0 ! ] = 2 ?69:8 , the number of right quartets is 8.
To attack 10-round Serpent (rounds 0{9) we use a similar technique to the one used in 6]. We request 2 62:8 structures of 2 64 plaintexts each. The structures are chosen so that each structure varies over all the possible inputs to the active S boxes in round 1, while the input of the rest of the S boxes is kept xed (this is done by checking which S boxes in round 0 a ect the active bits in round 1, and trying all the inputs to theses S boxes). Using this procedure for choosing the plaintexts we get 2 125:8 pairs with di erence after round 0.
We keep all the plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts in a large table (whose size is 2 126:8 2 16 = 2 131:8 bytes of memory), and keep 2 84 4-bit counters, where each counter corresponds to one of the possible values of the 84 bits of the subkeys we search for (64 bits entering 16 S boxes in the rst round, and 20 bits entering 5 S boxes in the last round). In order to count the number of quartets with the given and we perform the following algorithm:
1. Initialize the counter's array with 0's. 2. For each 64-bit subkey value in round 0, for each 20-bit value subkey value in round 9, and for each plaintext x: Partially encrypt x through round 0 in the 16 S boxes and denote the value we get by x 1 . Calculate x 1 and denote this value by y 1 . Partially decrypt y 1 through round 0 in the 16 S boxes, and nd the corresponding plaintext, which we denote by y (this plaintext y exists in our data, due to the way we choose the structures). The value of the plaintext bits of y related to the other 16 S boxes is the same as of x. Let x 00 and y 00 be the corresponding ciphertexts of x and y respectively. then, Partially decrypt through the 5 active S boxes x 00 and y 00 , denote the value you get by x 00 9 and y 00 9 , respectively. Partially encrypt x 00 9 and y 00 3. Run over all counters, and print the corresponding indices whose counter is greater than or equal to 7. The inner loop is performed at most 2 84 2 126:8 times, and includes at most 4 times encrypting 16 S boxes (equivalent to two rounds of Serpent) and 4 times decrypting 5 S boxes (equivalent to 5/8 rounds of Serpent). Thus, the time complexity of the attack is at most 2 84 2 125:8 2 5 8 =10 2 208:4 10-round Serpent encryptions. The time complexity can be reduced by half by building in advance an equivalent table in which each entry i contains S 1 (S ?1 1 (i) ) and use it in the last round, and similarly computing a table with S ?1 0 (S 0 (i) ) for the rst round.
Reducing Time Requirements
One can also use the technique of hash tables presented in 5] to reduce the time complexity to 2 205 memory accesses, in exchange of increasing the memory complexity to 2 196 bytes of RAM.
Summary
In this paper we presented the best published attack on 10-round 256-bit key Serpent We presented a di erential attack on 7-round Serpent, which works for all the key sizes, with data complexity of 2 84 chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2 85 memory accesses and 2 52 memory. We presented an attack on 8-round 256-bit key Serpent requiring 2 84 chosen plaintexts, 2 213 time and 2 84 memory. We summarize these results in Table 1 .
We also presented the best known 3-round, 4-round, 5-round and 6-round di erential characteristics of Serpent, whose probabilities are 2 ?15 , 2 ?29 , 2 ?60 and 2 ?93 , respectively. In Table 2 we summarize these characteristics and the best previously published characteristics. The 3-round di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?15 that we get is as follows: In round 2 (or 10 or 18 or any other round having S 2 ) the following characteristic holds with probability 2 ?8 :
After the linear transformation and the application of S 3 we get the following di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?3 :
After the linear transformation and the application of S 4 we get the following di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?4 :
During the search for the best characteristic, we exhaustively checked all possible 3-round characteristics with 7 active S boxes and found this to be the best possible characteristic. As all 3-round characteristics have at least 7 active S boxes, and with 8 active S boxes the probability of the characteristic is at Checking the S boxes for such instances we found out that the best characteristic is when the rst round of the 4-round characteristic is set at rounds using S 1 . We receive the following 4-round di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?29 : In round 1 (or any other round having S 1 ) the following characteristic holds with probability 2 ?11 :
After the linear transformation and the application of S 2 we get the following di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?5 :
After the linear transformation and the application of S 4 we get the following di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?10 :
B.2 A 4-Round Characteristics for Rounds 5{8
This second 4-round di erential characteristic is used along with the previous one in the attack of Section 5, and has probability of 2 ?47 . We use the basic characteristic described in 10], where a 5-round di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?61 is described. As we need a characteristic of round 5{8, we remove the last round and get a 4-round characteristic with probability 2 ?48 . As part of our e orts to nd higher probability di erential characteristics for the ampli ed boomerang attack, we try a technique found very useful in previous attempts: we add another active S box in the rst round. This might seem a bad thing (as this reduces the probability) but we found out that in exchange we get 3 more entries with probability 1/4 instead of 1/8. Thus, our characteristic has probability of 2 ?47 : In round 5 (or any other round having S 5 ) the following characteristic holds with probability 2 ?24 :
After the linear transformation and the application of S 6 we get the following di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?16 :
After the linear transformation and the application of S 7 we get the following di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?5 :
After the linear transformation and the application of S 0 we get the following di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?2 :
Note that the last two rounds are the same as in 10].
C A 5-Round Di erential Characteristic
As stated in Appendix B, we took a 5-round characteristic from 10], truncated it and improved it to have 4-round characteristic. By adding the last round from 10] back to the characteristic we get a 5-round characteristic with probability 2 ?60 . Thus, we add after the 4th round of the characteristic from Appendix B.2 the following round, which apply S 1 , and has probability of 2 ?13 :
We have found another 5-round di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?60 , and three more characteristics with probability 2 ?61 which are quite similar to the this one.
D A 6-Round Di erential Characteristics
In order to get the best 6-round characteristic we can, we add a round before the 5-round characteristic from Appendix C and alter the rst two rounds of it.
Thus, the 6-round characteristic starts in a round using S 4 , and has probability 2 ?93 . In round 4 (or any other round having S 4 ) the following characteristic holds with probability 2 ?28 :
After the linear transformation and the application of S 5 we get the following di erential characteristic with probability 2 ?29 :
-29
After this round the di erence described for S 7 , S 0 and S 1 in Appendices B.2 and C.
We observe that there are 2 14 6-round characteristics with the same last 5-rounds (only the input di erence of the rst round changes). This follows from the fact that in 2 S boxes in the rst round we have 8 possible input di erences with the same probability for the given output di erences and in 8 S boxes we have two possibilities.
We also observed that by rotating all the characteristics one bit to the left (or two) the characteristics remain valid with the same probability (rotation by three or more bits does not work).
